Performance Evaluation of Coalition and Bargaining Games for Efficient and Fair Bandwidth Allocation


The KIPS Transactions:PartC, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 385-390, Aug. 2010
10.3745/KIPSTC.2010.17.4.385,   PDF Download:

Abstract

Fair and efficient bandwidth allocation methods using the coalition game theory and the bargaining game theory following the axiomatic approach have been proposed when sending nodes with different traffic input rate try to share the bandwidth. These methods satisfy the axiomatic fairness provided by the mathematical ground of the game theories. However, since the axioms of the two game models are different from one another, the allocated bandwidths to each sending nodes become different even in the same communication environments. Thus, in this paper, we model the bandwidth allocation problem with these game theories, and quantitatively compare and analyze the allocated bandwidth and loss rate of each sending nodes in various communication environments. The results show that the bargaining game allocates relatively less bandwidth to a node with a higher sending rate than that with a lower sending rate while coalition game allocates bandwidth according to the sending rate of each node.


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Cite this article
[IEEE Style]
J. S. Park, "Performance Evaluation of Coalition and Bargaining Games for Efficient and Fair Bandwidth Allocation," The KIPS Transactions:PartC, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 385-390, 2010. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2010.17.4.385.

[ACM Style]
Jae Sung Park. 2010. Performance Evaluation of Coalition and Bargaining Games for Efficient and Fair Bandwidth Allocation. The KIPS Transactions:PartC, 17, 4, (2010), 385-390. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2010.17.4.385.