Yang Yu Jin, Jang Kyung Bae, Kim Hyun Ji, Song Gyung Ju, Lim Se Jin, Seo Hwa Jeong

KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems, Vol. 11, No. 12, pp. 453-460, Dec. 2022
https://doi.org/10.3745/KTCCS.2022.11.12.453,   PDF Download:
Keywords: Quantum Computer, Lightweight Block cipher, SPARKLE, Grover Search Algorithm
Abstract

As high-performance quantum computers are expected to be developed, studies are being actively conducted to build a post-quantum security system that is safe from potential quantum computer attacks. When the Grover’s algorithm, a representative quantum algorithm, is used to search for a secret key in a symmetric key cryptography, there may be a safety problem in that the security strength of the cipher is reduced to the square root. NIST presents the post-quantum security strength estimated based on the cost of the Grover’s algorithm required for an attack of the cryptographic algorithm as a post-quantum security requirement for symmetric key cryptography. The estimated cost of Grover's algorithm for the attack of symmetric key cryptography is determined by the quantum circuit complexity of the corresponding encryption algorithm. In this paper, the quantum circuit of the SCHWAEMM algorithm, AEAD family of SPARKLE, which was a finalist in NIST's lightweight cryptography competition, is efficiently implemented, and the quantum cost to apply the Grover’s algorithm is analyzed. At this time, the cost according to the CDKM ripple-carry adder and the unbounded Fan-Out adder is compared together. Finally, we evaluate the post-quantum security strength of the lightweight cryptography SPARKLE SCHWAEMM algorithm based on the analyzed cost and NIST's post-quantum security requirements. A quantum programming tool, ProjectQ, is used to implement the quantum circuit and analyze its cost.

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